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CROSSING GUARDS ON THE ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY: 
THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER 
CONVERGENCE TECHNOLOGY 
ALAN Rosst & JENNIFER PAWSON* 
New communications technologies have emerged that involve the 
convergence of television, computer, cable, telephone and satellite. 
Proponents of these new technologies envision an explosion in the 
number of different channels which can offer programming. As well, 
convergence technology "is expected to make TV sets interactive, 
ushering in an era of 'pick-and-pay', do-it-yourself programming."1 
This development has been described in the popular media as an 
"electronic highway."2 When such "highways" function as conduits of 
programming for the general public they are best characterized as 
broadcasting. 
The controversy regarding jurisdiction over the electronic high-
way has been highlighted in the proceedings of recent CRTC 
hearings on the streamlining of telecommunications regulations.3 
The anticipated incursion of telephone companies into broadcast-
ing-type services has engendered concern in the cable industry. 
Telecommunications companies hope to escape the supervision of 
the CRTC, to which cable companies are subject, because of the 
different technologies each utilizes. 
Federal jurisdiction over broadcasting has been based on the ex-
ception to exclusive competence over local works and undertakings 
found in the combination of ss. 91(29) and 92(10)(a) of the 
t LL.B. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie). 
* B. Arts & Sc. (McMaster), LL.B. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie). 
1 C. Harris, "CRTC to pick specialty channels. Decision will be step toward 
transformation of television" The Globe and Mail (14 February 1994) Al. 
2 D. Flavelle, "Paving the Way for an Electronic Highway" The Toronto Star 
(24 October 1993) GI. 
3 H. Enchin, "CRTC heads down new road. Hearing weighs competing 
interests of the information highway" The Globe and Mail (1 November 1993) 
Bl, BS. 
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Constitution Act, 1867.4 Electronic highways may simply use dif-
ferent technologies to do that which has historically been conceived 
of as broadcasting. Accordingly, they should fall within the juris-
diction of the federal government. The fact that this technology has 
a national dimension to it makes federal control all the more ap-
propriate. 
Changes to the Broadcasting Act5 suggest that electronic high-
ways used to disseminate programming are a "broadcasting" activ-
ity as defined bys. 2(1) of that Act. The historical evolution of the 
Broadcasting Act indicates that Parliament has adopted, in the pre-
sent version of the Act, an expanded approach to the definition of 
broadcasting which removes the previous limits on the technology 
involved. This suggests that federal involvement in the regulation of 
new broadcasting technology is consistent with previous federal 
mandates.6 
In the 1968 version of the Broadcasting Act, "broadcasting" was 
defined to mean "any radiocommunication in which the transmissions 
are intended for direct reception by the general public" [emphasis 
added].7 In 1991, the new Broadcasting Act redefined the term as 
ref erring to 
any transmission of programs, whether or not encrypted, 
by radio waves or other means of telecommunication for re-
ception by the public by means of a broadcast receiving 
apparatus, but does not include any such transmission of 
programs that is made solely for performance or display 
in a public place [emphasis added], 
and 2(2) goes on to say: 
For the purposes of this Act, "other means of telecom-
munication" means any wire, cable, radio, optical or 
4 Constitution Act, 1867(U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, ss. 91(29), 92(10)(a); Radio 
Reference, [1932] A.C. 304 (P.C.); Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. CRTC, 
[1978] 2S.C.R 141; PublicServiceBoardv. Dionne, [1978] 2S.C.R. 191. 
5 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11 as am. by the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 
1993, c. 38, s. 81. 
6 Canadian Voices: Canadian Choices (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1988). See also 
S. Scott, "The New Broadcasting Act: An Analysis" (1990) 1 M.C.L.R. 25 at 26-
27. 
7 Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-9, s. 2. 
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other electromagnetic system, or any similar technical 
system.8 
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The expansion of the definition of "broadcasting" within the 
Broadcasting Act to refer to an increased scope of technology has 
been a calculated and purposeful endeavour. In 1986, the Task Force 
on Broadcasting Policy maintained that: 
The Act should broaden the definition of broadcasting 
and related concepts to cover all types of program recep-
tion and distribution whether by Hertzian waves or 
through any other technology [emphasis added]. 9 
Parliament clearly wanted to ensure that no undertakings were ex-
cluded from the definition of broadcasting simply because the 
technology used was innovative or unprecedented. 
Changes in the Act to notions of what comprises the viewing 
audience further ensure that electronic highways are not excluded 
from the definition of broadcasting. 
Jurisprudence decided under the old Broadcasting Act1° held that 
broadcasting required an intention to transmit directly to the 
general public in order to come within the meaning of 
"broadcasting" under that Act. 11 Because transmissions over fibre-
optic wire, unlike radio communications, cannot be intercepted and 
can be limited to exclusive groups of users, a requirement for a 
broad audience could have taken some applications of convergence 
technology out of the realm of the old Broadcasting Act. The signif-
icance of cases which imply that the public, in the context of broad-
casting, is "the general public," and represents large numbers of 
people, 12 has been undermined by changes to the definition of 
"broadcasting." Arguably, Parliament was reacting to such cases 
when it removed both the requirement for intention, and the word 
"general," modifying "public," in the new Broadcasting Act.13 This 
B Supra note 5. 
9 "Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, September 1986" in 
R. Bird, ed., Documents of Canadian Broadcasting (Ottawa: Carleton University 
Press, 1988) 704 at 737. See also S. Scott, supra note 6 at 33. 
10 Supra note 5. 
11 Lount Corp. v. Canada (A.G.) (1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) 305 at 311. 
12 Supra note 11. See also R. v. Communicomp Data Ltd. (1975) 6 O.R. (2d) 680 
(Co. Ct.). 
l3 Supra note 6. 
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further supports the position that "highways" ought to be considered 
within the scope of broadcasting. 
The words of the new Broadcasting Act, when compared with the 
earlier definition of "broadcasting" imply that the public is not the 
general public, but can encompass much less "general" groups. 
Decisions have held that the meaning of the word "public" must be 
context specific. 14 It should be acknowledged that a change in 
legislation will be a fundamental part of that context. 
The nature of the Broadcasting system itself is the most signifi-
cant part of the context, giving meaning to the word "broadcasting" 
in the definition of broadcasting. Broadcasting in Canada is a 
system which has many constituent parts reaching different sub-
groups of the "general public" who still comprise the "public." 15 An 
interpretation that the "public" necessarily means a large number of 
people, broadly situated, frustrates the purpose of the changes to the 
Broadcasting Act to ensure its application to a wide scope of 
technology. Users of cable services are often limited geographically 
and in number, yet cable has consistently been characterized as 
broadcasting. 16 Courts should be reticent to exclude programming 
undertakings from the ambit of broadcasting merely because of the 
point-to-point nature of convergence technology they use. 
The fact that there may be an eligibility requirement in order 
to use certain services of an electronic highway, such as paying a fee, 
or being enrolled in a course, does not mean that "the admitted few 
lose their identity as members of the public." 17 Indeed, the 
Broadcasting Act contemplates that broadcasting may be connected 
to other undertakings without ceasing to be "broadcasting."18 
After having established that electronic highways come within 
the ambit of broadcasting when used for program dissemination, 
the argument that they should fall under federal jurisdiction is en-
hanced by an inquiry into the nature and role of the broadcasting 
system within Canadian society. Legislative jurisdiction over com-
14 Atlantic Shopping Centres Ltd. v. Newfoundland (A.G.) (1988), 71 Nfld. & 
P.E.I.R. 175. See also ]enningsv. Stephens (1934), [1936] l Ch. 469. 
15 Supra note 5, s. 3(2). 
16 Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canada (CTRC), supra note 4. 
17 In University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 at 382, the 
Supreme Court of Canada found that students in universities retained their 
identity as members of the public in the context of the Canadian Human Rights 
Act. 
18 Supra note 5, s. 4(3). 
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munications is divided between the federal and provincial legisla-
tures through the operation of 92(10) and 91(29). 19 The exception 
stated ins. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867 establishes that 
provinces have the power to make laws in relation to: 
Local works and undertakings other than such as are of the 
following classes: 
(a) Lines of steam or other ships, railways, canals, 
telegraphs, and other works and undertakings con -
necting the province with any other or other of the 
provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the 
province. 20 
Electronic highways fall within this class of exception because the 
nature of those undertakings is interprovincial, rather than local. 
Some would argue that not all applications of convergence 
technology to broadcasting fall within federal legislative compe-
tence. The very nature of fibre-optics, as a closed system of point-
to-point communication, allows undertakings to be designed which 
do not extend beyond provincial borders. Unlike radio, television 
and existing cable systems, parts of which all include signals exter-
nal to the system, convergence activities may be entirely self-con-
tained. Therefore, the historical rationale for federal jurisdiction 
over broadcasting21 may not apply to, for example, an undertaking 
that uses convergence to transmit videos directly to people's homes 
within a single province. The fact that some of the material offered 
through such services may have extraprovincial content will not 
bring it within the interprovincial exception from provincial 
competence. 22 
Nevertheless, a broader ground for federal legislative compe-
tence over broadcasting helps articulate why electronic highways do 
l9 P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
1992) at 566-568. 
20 Constitutional Act, 1867, supra note 4, s. 92(10)(a). 
21 Federal jurisdiction over radiocommunication, television and cable 
undertakings which transmit programs received from the airwaves has been based 
on the interprovincial nature of broadcasting which uses "the airwaves" which do 
not respect provincial boundaries. See Radio Reference, supra note 4; Capital 
Cities Communications v. CRTC, supra note 4; Public Service Bd. v. Dionne, supra 
note 4. 
22 In NS. Board o/Censorsv. McNeii [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, the Supreme Court of 
Canada found that the display of extraprovincial films was not sufficient to 
remove the regulation of theatres from provincial legislative competence. 
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not resemble local undertakings and should therefore not fall within 
provincial jurisdiction. Although federal jurisdiction over 
electronic highways may slightly encroach on provincial 
jurisdiction under 92(10), this incidental effect is essential for the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction over broadcasting. 
The system of broadcasting in Canada is a functional arrange-
ment through which individual undertakings are interconnected. 23 
Federal power over local undertakings is essential for the mainte-
nance of that larger national system.24 To this end, although federal 
jurisdiction over broadcasting has historically been grounded on the 
extraprovincial nature of a particular undertaking, the ex-
traprovincial nature of broadcasting as a whole indicates that even 
individual or provincial "highways" must be under federal jurisdic-
tion.25 
The composite system of broadcasting in Canada should serve 
the interests of all Canadians and their need to express themselves in 
order to "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, 
social and economic fabric of Canada."26 Such interests, and other 
national policy objectives, are best protected by federal 
jurisdiction. 
If the integrity of the broadcasting system cannot be used to 
support federal jurisdiction of electronic highways under the inter-
provincial exception to 92(1 O), the federal Legislature's residual 
power to enact laws for the peace, order and good government of 
the Dominion provides an alternative source of federal jurisdiction. 
The "Peace, Order, and Good Government" (P.O.G.G.) power 
generally refers to matters which have not been enumerated under 
the heads of federal or provincial jurisdiction in s. 91 or 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. They are thereby conferred on the federal 
Parliament. If a matter "goes beyond local or provincial concern or 
interest and must from its inherent nature be the concern of the 
Dominion as a whole,"27 then it is established as a matter of 
23 See Broadcasting Act, supra note 5, s. 3(2). 
24 I. H. Fraser, "Some Comments on Subsection 92(10) of the Constitution Act 
1867" (1984) 29 McGill L.J. 557. 
25 Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television 
Commission, supra note 4 at 159; Public Service Board v. Dionne, supra note 4 at 
197. 
26 Broadcasting Act, supra note 5, s. 3(l)(d)(i). See also Bird, supra note 9 at 739. 
27 Ontario (/1.G.)v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at 205. 
THE ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY 215 
"national concern" and serves as the basis of the P.O.G.G. power.28 
Electronic information highways involved in program 
dissemination may be encompassed by the P.O.G.G. power on the 
grounds that they are a new area of activity, and a matter of national 
concern which may be beyond the power of the provinces to deal 
with.29 
The intra-provincial and extra-provincial aspects of "electronic 
information highways" are not practically divisible. Their use of 
technology represents a component of a single communications sys-
tem. That type of system has been described as 
the electronic thread knitting the country together over 
the vast area it occupies, through the sophisticated array 
of personal, business, and mass communication services it 
provides to all Canadians. 
That system is an important vehicle of national unity. 
It is a significant creator and carrier of national identity 
and culture.30 
Such an holistic approach to the system of communications in 
Canada reflects an appropriate basis for policy-making with respect 
to the regulation of electronic highways and would decrease unnec-
essary complexity and duplication in regulating systems. 
Without uniformity of law throughout the country, one province 
may fail to regulate such things as the maintenance of, or content of 
programming on, electronic highways. This would damage the 
effectiveness of the entire system, and would negatively impact 
users in other provinces.31 It is therefore essential to have uniform 
legislative treatment of new broadcasting technologies. Without 
such treatment, there is a danger that these technologies will 
develop in an incoherent manner and that Canadians may simply 
become "jaywalkers," rather than active and full participants on new 
information highways. 
28 johnnesson v. Rural Municipality of St. Paul, [1952] l S.C.R. 292. 
29 See P. W. Hogg, supra note 19 at 435ff: R v. Hauser, [1979] l S.C.R. 984. See 
also R. v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, [1988] 1 S.C.R 401; Munro v. National 
Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663. 
30 Canada, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee 
on Communications and Culture (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 5 November 1991) at 
15.4. 
3I See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., supra note 29. 
